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Abstract—BlAsT is an efficient scheme for achieving certi-
fication of data continuity through a history attached to a
public blockchain. The scheme guarantees the properties of
linearity, non-equivocation, time-stamping and transparency. We
discuss the implementation of BlAsT over the Bitcoin and the
Ethereum blokchains, provide a techno-economic analysis to
evaluate the costs related to blockchain adoption, and numerically
assess the performance of the proposed architecture in terms
of storage and bandwidth requirements. Results show that the
above properties can be guaranteed with a small cryptocurrency
payment. The proposed scheme can be used for IoT devices
under the assumption that the device is able to either perform
blockchain validation or delegate it to a trusted node.
Index Terms—Blockchain, key transparency, IoT authentica-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is gaining increasing attention
from both enterprise and consumer sides. Even the simplest
products are expected to be connected to the Internet in the
near future, thus triggering the development of new value-
added IT services impacting, among others, supply chain
management, logistics, and post-sale services. A basic re-
quirement for most of such services is the management of
cryptographic keys. Current approaches are far from perfect
and suffer of inadequate trust models, lack of transparency,
and difficulties in auditing the behavior of trusted third parties.
So far, certificate transparency [1] has been successful at fixing
some issues of the TLS certificate system and there have been
attempts to extend it to generic records of data associated to
an ID (e.g. CONIKS [2] and Google Key Transparency [3]).
These approaches require, however, a dedicated infrastructure
of trusted nodes, which limits scalability. Usage of a public
blockchain is therefore an appealing approach for reducing
deployment costs by leveraging a shared infrastructure capable
of providing a trusted environment.
This paper defines BlAsT, a key transparency infrastructure
suitable for implementation over the two most popular public
blockchains, i.e. Bitcoin and Ethereum. Then, it evaluates
its suitability for deployment in the IoT context. Finally, it
evaluates the expected cost of the operation of the BlAsT
scheme. To achive this result, we implemented a simple proof-
of-concept of the BlAsT solution and run them on the Bitcoin
and Ethereum test networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II overviews related works and highlights their differences with
respect to BlAsT. Section III describes the BlAsT architecture,
goals and protocols. Section IV discusses the implementation
of BlAsT over Bitcoin and Ethereum and compares their
requirements and costs. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Some recent works have addressed the problem of key
authentication. Certificate Transparency (CT) [1] is a standard
proposed by IETF aimed at solving some SSL structural flaws.
CT uses append-only certificates logs that can be queried by
any party and defines the roles of monitors and auditors which
interact with logs servers to search for dangerous certificates
and check their consistency. This open framework enables
an early detection of forged certificates and faster mitigation
based on certificate revocation mechanisms.
CONIKS [2] introduces privacy-preserving features in order
to avoid leaks of other data when querying for specific users.
CONIKS defines a model for the management of public keys
related to email addresses, which is based on the concept
of continuous identity. The inclusion of a binding ID - key
does not ensure by itself the correctness of the key, which
must be guaranteed by the identity provider, but the binding
remains valid over time and the identity owner can verify
what keys are associated to his/her identity at the various
providers, making it simple to detect spurious keys in the case
of a compromised identity provider. The CONIKS framework
guarantees two properties: non-equivocation and validity. Our
proposed framework strengthens such properties by using the
blockchain as a single source of truth, which reduces the need
for additional gossiping protocols and for continuous auditing
processes performed by trusted nodes. Indeed, BlAsT entities
must reach consensus only about the data history antecedent
to the blockchain join, then they will be able to verify non-
equivocation and validity by themselves.
Google Key Transparency [3] is a recent open-source project
that builds upon CONIKS and Certificate Transparency. Its
basic principle is that the relationship between an entity and
its cryptographic keys must be automatically verifiable and
publicly auditable. This is achieved by defining a Merkle
Tree that makes it possible to verify the inclusion of any
given information. A gossiping protocol between monitors,
key servers and users must guarantee that all the key servers
share the same state. BlAsT aims at achieving the same
objectives by adopting the blockchain technology to reach
consensus on the state of the key logs built by a key server.
Among blockchain-based solutions, EthIKS [4] relies on the
Ethereum [5] protocol, a decentralized platform in which it
is possible to reach consensus also about the state of some
code using the smart contract paradigm. Since the storage
model of Ethereum is based on a Merkle Patricia Tree, EthIKS
implements the CONIKS structure as a smart contract with
the aim of guaranteeing the non-equivocation property (i.e.,
avoiding forks within the network). The drawback of the
EthIKS solution is that, for every change of information, the
identity provider has to update the smart contract state, which
has a cost both in term of bandwidth and execution. As the
number of updates per day is expected to be relevant, this
introduces scalability issues. In comparison to EthIKS, BlAsT
introduces much smaller costs.
Chronicled [6] proposes to equip smart things with Blou-
etooth Low Energy (BLE) or Near-Field Communications
(NFC) chips, which securely store cryptographic keys that are
also paired with an identity on an Ethereum smart contract.
In this case, each digital identity can have different values
depending on the kind of object it is attached to. Chronicled’s
solution operates at hardware level, whereas BlAsT focuses
on digital ID - keys bindings.
Certcoin [7] adopts a blockchain that is specifically de-
signed to replace the current Public Key Infrastructure. It is
built over Namecoin, the first fork of Bitcoin. Certcoin allows
entities to register a new binding name - cryptographic keys
and, later, to update or revoke the binding, without need of
third parties. Differently from BlAsT, Certcoin is focused on
the verification of the data stored on the blockchain and does
not tackle the issuance problem.
III. BLAST: BLOCKCHAIN-ASSISTED KEY
TRANSPARENCY
A. Protocol Entities
The BlAsT framework comprises the following entities,
shown in Figure 1.
a) Identity Provider: each provider is responsible for a
different namespace with its own bindings. It receives clients’
registration requests, adds the client’s data to a Merkle binary
prefix tree data structure, and signs the tree root at each
epoch. Each Provider holds a public/private key pair for digital
signatures and a blockchain address, which is used to identify
where the provider writes the data on the blockchain. We
assume that the binding among an identity provider, its public
key and its blockchain address is known through an external
authentication mechanism.
b) User: the end users of the system must use a software
client for every interaction with the other actors. A client sends
registration requests to the corresponding identity provider,
monitors consistency of its bindings and saves results of prior
checks. The client may or may not have read access to the
blockchain, depending on the capabilities of the devices over
which it is installed.
c) Authenticator: when a user needs to contact another
user, its client starts a lookup procedure for the authentication
data associated to the recipient’s ID. The sender client re-
trieves the recipient’s data from the identity provider and then
accesses the blockchain in order to verify their consistency
and validity.
d) Auditor: auditing by external nodes is required only
when bootstrapping new clients. Since the non-equivocation is
guaranteed by the uniqueness of the blockchain, once a client
knows the blockchain address of an Identity Provider, it will
be able to autonomously audit its behavior. The information
that must be audited is therefore limited to the data history
antecedent to the join of the blockchain.
e) Blockchain: a network of nodes used for storing
relevant information that can be accessed in any moment
by every entity. It grows in discrete time instants when a
block of information is added and is secured thanks to the
computational power dedicated by the miners.
B. Framework and Protocol Description
The BlAsT framework adopts a three-layer infrastructure.
The application layer is in charge of the data management and
interacts with the the transparency layer by communicating
messages in the form of key-value pairs, so that each piece of
information can be uniquely identified. The transparency layer
is in charge of managing the Merkle tree used to authenticate
the dataset. It builds the tree on behalf of the Identity Provider
and verifies that a given key-value pair belongs to the tree
on behalf of the Authenticator. The root of the Merkle tree
represents the commitment of the Provider to a specific dataset
at a specific time and is passed to the underlying blockchain
layer. The blockchain layer enforces the linear history of the
dataset, making the commitment publicly available, auditable,
immutable, and timestamped. Once the commitment is stored
in the blockchain, it is possible to prove that a given key-
value pair is, or is not, included in the dataset at a specific
time within a certified data history.
To this aim, the BlAsT protocol comprises the following
phases:
a) Registration: a client contacts the correct identity
provider to register or update a binding between a user ID and
a public key in the form (u, PKu), where u is the user ID and
PKu is the user’s public key. The client receives a proof of
inclusion in the system. Since the dataset is updated only at
discrete epochs, the operation is considered as concluded only
at the beginning of the next epoch, when the client can check
if the binding has been correctly inserted using the received
proof of inclusion.
Fig. 1. The architecture and three-layer structure of BlAsT
b) STR write: to guarantee the non-equivocation prop-
erty, identity providers write on the blockchain the Signed
Tree Root (STR). The growth of the STR-chain enforced on
the blockchain is discrete and the frequency can coincide with
the epoch frequency or can be lowered for the sake of cost
reduction. Each identity provider is associated to a blockchain
address and holds the corresponding writing rights. This is
enforced by the blockchain logic.
c) Key Lookup: clients should always be able to contact
an Identity Provider to retrieve the information related to a
specific user. If the user is part of its namespace and is
currently registered, the Identity Provider returns the user’s
public key PKu and the proof of inclusion composed by:
• the index j of the user identity in the Merkle binary prefix
tree. Indexes are calculated with a Verifiable Random
Function to prevent leaking information about the users
in the dataset;
• a cryptographic commit to the pair (u, PKu);
• the authentication path in the Merkle tree from the above
commit to the root of the tree;
• the signature of the root of the Merkle tree.
Otherwise, the identity provider returns a proof of absence
for the index j corresponding to the requested user identity.
The proof is calculated in the same way as [2]. The proof of
absence is used by the client to detect possibly spurious keys.
d) STR retrieval: to verify the consistency and validity
of the data managed by the identity providers, clients retrieve
from the blockchain the most recent STR. A client with
direct read access to the blockchain can perform these checks
autonomously. Otherwise, the client can rely on some trusted
nodes to perform part of the validation.
e) Monitoring of spurious keys: periodically, each client
performs a key lookup upon its identity providers for its own
identity to verify the correctness of its binding. Each client also
performs a key lookup upon various others identity providers
to verify that there are no spurious keys associated to its
identifier.
f) Auditing for non-equivocation: Since the blockchain
guarantees that, once the address of an identity provider
is known, the clients are able to follow the growth of the
blockchain to get the new STRs, the auditing must be per-
formed only at bootstrapping time for every client, which then
could be completely independent from external auditors. A
client can decide to query the blockchain at each epoch or to
get updated only when it has to verify the consistency of new
data.
C. Device Capabilities
A read operation from a public blockchain does not cost
any money. However validating the read data requires some
computational effort, which impacts the cost and complexity
of the client node and the suitability of the solution for IoT
devices. Depending on the capabilities of a device, different
clients can be installed:
a) Full node: it stores locally the whole blockchain with
complete blocks. In this way it is possible to locally validate
both transactions and blocks. A full node does not trust any
other single node of the network. Since everything is stored
locally, a read operation can be completed locally. The main
drawback is the cost of the device, both in terms of storage
and bandwidth.
b) Light node: differently from a full node, a light
node only downloads the block headers, the transactions it
is interested in, and a proof of inclusion of these transactions
in the blockchain. In the bitcoin network this technique is
known as SPV - Simple Payment Verification and requires
less bandwidth and storage than running a full node. A light
node does not trust any other single node of the network, but
requires the cooperation of a full node for carrying on read
operations.
c) Non-blockchain enabled: a device that has not enough
capabilities to run a full or light client, must contact a trusted
remote node. This configuration is the lightest in term of
hardware and bandwidth requirements, but introduces a trust
problem towards the remote node.
D. Properties
BlAsT aims at satisfying the following properties:
• Transparency: thanks to the use of a Merkle Tree, a small
proof of inclusion or absence at the transparency layer
is able to guarantee that the client receives all the data
associated to a user ID at a given epoch at a given Identity
Provider. The use of permission-less blockchains makes
it possible for anyone to verify that the answer is correct
without further involvement of the Identity Provider.
• Non-equivocation: the blockchain acts as a single source
of truth. After a user has solved the bootstrapping issue,
he/she is able to move backward and forward through
the linear history of data directly on the blockchain, in
order to verify the uniqueness of the history. The only
possibility for a compromised Identity Provider to main-
tain multiple instances of the key database, is to anchor
each instance to a different fork of the blockchain. This
is considered unfeasible except for very short periods.
• Efficient time-stamping: when data are written to the
blockchain, they are also timestamped, since every block
has a timestamp header field. Thanks to this time in-
formation, if an attacker obtains the Identity Provider’s
secret key, he/she cannot forge a new history and date it
back to the past since it is considered not computationally
feasible to rewrite the blockchain history.
• Timeless certification: this property is a direct conse-
quence of the previous three. If the Identity Provider that
certified some data becomes inactive, it is always possible
to certify the validity of its data if we have such data and
the related proof. This is possible because the blockchain
history will still be accessible by anyone and this property
remains valid as long as the blockchain remains alive.
IV. EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTATIONS
In this Section, we discuss how our proposed framework
can be integrated with existing blockchain technologies such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Moreover, we evaluate the storage
and bandwidth requirements necessary for the validation of
the information retrieved by the blockchain.
A. BlAsT over the Bitcoin Blockchain
BlAsT implementation on the Bitcoin blockchain is very
similar to Tomescu’s Catena [8]. At each epoch, the Identity
Providers write the signature of the Merkle tree root in a
Blockchain transaction using the OP_RETURN opcode, which
makes it possible to store arbitrary data. To save the data
and update their value over time, BlAsT uses an approach
similar to the transaction chain defined in [9]. The identity
provider is identified by one blockchain address that represents
the entry point for its data on the blockchain. All the entities
in the framework must reach consensus about such address.
Ideally, the address should be related to only two transactions:
a charge transaction, which is motivated later, and the first
STR transaction. An STR transaction has one input and two
outputs. One output is an OP_RETURN and includes the
STR, while the other is a classic P2PKH output toward a
new blockchain address that is also controlled by the identity
provider. When the provider wants to update the STR at a
later epoch, he creates a new STR transaction that spends
the output of the previous STR transaction. In this way, all
the STRs are chained together by Bitcoin’s transactions and
an identity provider cannot decide to fork this history, thus
being prevented from double-updating the STR-chain. Note
that, even if the STR chain is enforced on the blockchain,
the miners do not care about the data stored through the
OP_RETURN script. Therefore, when a client retrieves a new
STR, it has to check its correctness with respect to the previous
one.
a) Blockchain storage: At the current market rates, the
cost of storage depends on the size of the transaction, the
acceptable delay before the transaction is included in a block,
and the size of the queue of other users’ transactions waiting
to be included in a block. We used 21.co (now earn.com) tool
that predicts Bitcoin transaction fees [10]. It uses a Montecarlo
simulation in order to predict miners and queue sizes. The
simulation tool outputs an estimate of the fees to be paid in
Satoshi/Byte to get a 90% confidence interval that a transaction
will be included in a block after a certain delay. A BlAsT
transaction (with one input and two outputs) accounts for about
267 bytes. Table I shows the estimated fees as of May 2017
with an exchange rate of 1100 EUR/BTC. If the epoch is set
to 1 hour, then it is advised to consider only the first column
with a 160 Satoshis per byte fee. If instead the epoch is set
to 1 day, all the columns can be considered.
b) Client requirements: In case of a full node, consider-
ing the current block size limit of 1MB and an average block
time of 10 minutes, the local blockchain grows 144MB per
day. The bandwidth requirements are harder to evaluate since
they depend on the client configuration. The official Bitcoin
Core implementation requires a download of 500MB/day and
an upload of 5GB/day for a full node which actively con-
tributes to the whole network. The bare minimum requirements
can be around 150MB/day for download and 10MB/day for
TABLE I
TRANSACTION COST EXPRESSED IN SATOSHIS AND EURO WITH DELAY
INFORMATION
Transaction cost (satoshi/byte)
160 140 120
Delay (Blocks) 0 0 - 1 0 - 23
Delay (Minutes) 0 - 25 0 - 40 0 - 300
Tx. cost (Satoshis) 42720 37380 32040
Tx. cost (EUR) 0.47 0.41 0.35
upload. The bootstrapping requires at least a download of
100GB for recovering the blockchain starting from the genesis
block.
Conversely, a light node is only required to download
around 12KB/day since each block header accounts for 80
Bytes, plus some overhead for communication and keep-alive
messages (again in the order of some KB). The retrieval of
one block from a peer node requires at most 1MB.
Finally, for non-blockchain enabled nodes, assuming a sce-
nario in which it is possible to establish a trust relationship
with another peer node, a query that already returns the desired
STR requires an exchange of only 7.5KB. This value has
been evaluated using the Blocktrail platform, which accepts
interactions only over SSL, and is a lower bound that does not
consider possible overhead due to errors during transmission.
B. BlAsT over the Ethereum Blockchain
Ethereum is a public blockchain with an underlying cryp-
tocurrency called Ether. An address can be an externally
owned address and being associated with a wallet, or a smart
contract address, which is associated not only to a wallet but
also to a code and state. Using a high level language such as
Solidity [11], it is possible to write the logic of a decentralized
application that can be deployed on the public Ethereum
blockchain and accessed through its smart contract address.
To change the state of a smart contract it is sufficient to send
a transaction to the smart contract address and the change of
state happens when this transaction is included inside a block.
Each operation has a cost expressed in gas units, which is
fixed by the Ethereum protocol. A user that wants to execute
a function of a contract must decide how much ether he/she
is willing to spend for every unit of gas, and this is expressed
through the gasPrice attribute of a transaction. The higher the
gasPrice, the higher the probability that a miner will choose
the transaction for creating the next block, because it will get
a higher reward in case it manages to solve the hash puzzle.
With the smart contract paradigm, we can include some BlAsT
logic on the blockchain.
a) Blockchain storage and execution: We have developed
a Solidity smart contract which is able to update the STR
of a specific provider only if it is cryptographically chained
to the previous STR, something that, with Bitcoin, must be
verified by the client that retrieves the STR. The costs to
be evaluated are the execution cost, which is determined by
the operations that must be executed on-contract, and the
transaction cost, that includes both the execution cost and the
TABLE II
SOLIDITY SMART CONTRACT EXECUTION COSTS FOR DIFFERENT
FUNCTIONS
gas Ether EUR
Deploy 841135 0.0168227 0.76
Init 159510 0.0031902 0.15
1st Update 103760 0.0020752 0.10
n-th Update 73760 0.0014752 0.07
size of the transaction that is sent to the peer-to-peer network.
The following results consider the transaction costs derived
with the online Solidity compiler for different functions:
• Deploy: the operation that makes the contract logic
available to anyone and that returns an Ethereum address.
The transaction cost is 841135 gas units. It is performed
only once, namely when BlAsT is used for the first time.
• Init: each identity provider is assigned an STR struct
which contains 8 fields (security policy, current epoch,
previous epoch, current Merkle Root, previous Merkle
Root, and the ECDSA signature parameters r, s, and v).
The first STR write operation costs 159510 gas units.
• Update: the updates to the contract are cheaper than the
init operation. The first update consumes 103760 gas
units, while the following ones consume 73760 gas units.
In Table II we show the current cost of execution with a
standard gasPrice of 0.00000002 Ether per unit of gas and a
conversion approximated to 1 ETH = 45 USD. If we consider
the update operation in Ethereum and STR-write in Bitcoin,
the former has consistently been from 5 to 7 times cheaper than
the latter throughout the first half of 2017 even if Ethereum
is also in charge of the continuity check of the STR-chain.
b) Client requirements: Ethereum does not impose a
block size limit: each block has a gasLimit attribute and the
number of transactions that can be included depends on the na-
ture of the code being triggered for execution. Two transactions
that occupy the same data volume might therefore consume
different amounts of gas. For our analysis we consider the
average values of the most important parameters of Ethereum
[12]:
• Gas limit: 4,170,000
• Block size: 2.5MB
• Block time: 14,5 seconds
In the case of a full node, a day sees around 6000 blocks,
which accounts for 15GB new data per day. The bandwidth
requirements are then very high, but in term of storage it
is possible to adopt State Tree Pruning [13] techniques that
reduce the required storage requirements (around 12GB with
Geth [14] and 6GB with Parity [15], the most used client).
Conversely, a light node adopting the Light Ethereum Sub-
protocol (which has been included for the first time at the end
of 2016 in Geth 1.5) operates only on block headers, which
are composed by different fields reaching about 500 Bytes,
resulting in a bandwidth consumption of around 3MB per day.
With pruning techniques the required storage can be reduced
to 10 MB, but current implementations use around 200 MB.
Finally, a non-blockchain enabled node can rely on the
INFURA service to get access to a remote node [16]. INFURA
exposes both mainnet and testnet nodes. Alternatively it is
possible to contact a known Ethereum node.
C. Techno-Economic Comparison
We have monitored Bitcoin exchange rates, Bitcoin fees,
Ether exchange rates and gasPrice average values over the
period from November 6th, 2016 to May 18th, 2017. In
Figure 2 we show the cost of a write operation for the three
implemented scenarios: BlAsT over Bitcoin (blue line), BlAsT
over an Ethereum full node (orange line), and BlAsT over an
Ethereum light node (green line).
Fig. 2. Cost trend (in EUR) of BlAsT write operations
Considering different client configurations, in Table III
we show the bandwidth requirements with some wireless
access technologies in order to understand which devices can
run a full or light node. We consider the fixed broadband
connections as having unlimited speed, as well as popular
mobile technologies suitable for long range communication
with devices. In particular we consider the 2G mobile standard
EDGE, which has a too small bandwidth for acting as a full
client, but could provide enough bandwidth for a light node,
both in the BTC and ETH implementations. The 3G/4G mobile
standards have a large bandwidth that can support full nodes.
Low Power WAN technologies such as SigFox or LoRa have
a too small bandwith and can support neither a full node nor
a light node. They might support a non-blockchain-enabled
node. The 4G mobile standard NB-IoT is expected to provide
enough bandwidth to support light BTC and ETH nodes, while
it cannot support full nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a blockchain-based approach
to achieve key management transparency thanks to a three-
layer architecture named BlAsT, which allows for the creation
of an immutable and publicly certifiable linear history. The
proposed framework can be built over different blockchain
technologies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. To identify the
most promising candidate, we performed a techno-economic
TABLE III
CLIENT CONFIGURATIONS AND ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES
analysis of costs related to blockchain write operations and
bandwidth consumption. Results show that BlAsT is a cost-
effective technique that makes it possible to end users to
monitor what keys are associated to their identities and identify
spurious keys.
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